With regard to the elections, the Vietnamese felt that the situation of the war forced the postponement of the elections until the country reached a certain degree of internal stability. By May, he had marked his opposition to the elections to the National Assembly, let alone against the national presidential elections. In their note to the French delegation, the Vietnamese also stated that a ceasefire without disarmament was incompatible with the elections; The consolidation of the warring forces into separate zones must jeopardize their freedom in advance. According to Vietnam, elections could only be envisaged after security and peace were put on the ground, which excluded a two-year interval. [doc. 73] Believing that the French have already gone far to empty some of the most important provisions of the memorandum between the United States and Great Britain, Dulles reaffirmed the government`s position that “it has no right to support a solution that could seriously affect us on certain principles that the United States believes should not be affected if our own fight against communism is successful.” Perhaps Dulles tried to rationalize the effects of his rejection and concluded by writing that the American decision could actually help the French: “If our behavior creates some uncertainty in the minds of the communists, it could strengthen your hand more than our presence in Geneva [Doc. 67] Mend es-Fraiice, however, had been rejected, and while Dulles left the door for his return or Smith`s return a little ajar, if the “circumstances” were to change, if the “circumstances” were to change. , it seemed more likely that France would have to work towards an agreement with the only British at its side. The Dulles-Mends-France scholarships were essentially an exercise in credibility, with the French Prime Minister desperately trying to convince the minister that Paris really supported the Seven Points and that he would truly respect them.

When Mendes-France read Dulles` letter, he protested that France would not accept anything in an unacceptable way for the United States and went so far as to say that Dulles` presence at the conference would effectively give him a veto over the decisions taken. Moreover, Mends-France warned of the disastrous consequences of an American withdrawal on the American position in Europe, no less than in the Far East; Withdrawal, he said, was certainly interpreted as a step towards isolationism. Asked about the alternative envisaged by his government if the conference were to fail with a high-level American presence, Mends-France replied that there had to be a complete internationalization of the war.