Take to heart the disadvantages of other evaluations. There is no work-life balance. The hours are long, the salary is marginal at best. Leaders are filled with incompetent people who were promoted in the good years and now “guide” with the good old boys` method. The company was sued 10 years ago for remuneration and promotion for women. Since then, little has changed. There are also hundreds (thousands?) of employees who should receive overtime, but not because the company illegally classifies them as paid. In addition to these two main problems, attitude is a joke. CHR is a public contractor and has no consistency all the way for interviews and hires.

Each institution can do whatever it wants and no training is required. And if all this is not enough, you certainly do not work here if you are a mother or a woman who intends to have children. Subtle discrimination is rife. It is not a women-friendly business. Id. at 698. The court quoted Restivo and said that a “strict interpretation of the law can be criticized as excessively technical, such a reading is consistent with Louisiana`s strong public policies that prohibit not competing.” Id. at 697 (city Restivo, 2007 WL 1341506, at *4). In particular L&B Transport, LLC v. Beech had an employment contract with a transport company. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, at Comet Industries, Inc.

v. Lawrence, found that a geographical restriction, like the statute of limitations in this case, violated Louisiana`s revised statute § 23:921. The court considered an agreement prohibiting the employee`s competition against the employer “anywhere in the continental United States” and found that a restriction imposed by “the parish or parishes, parishes, communities or parts thereof” in which the employer carried on business was not applicable. Comet Industries, Inc. vs. Lawrence, 600 so.2d 85, 87 (La. App. 2 cir. 1992) .C.H. Robinson argues that the District Court created an “unachievable burden” of prescient advocacy by requiring a leader “to try to anticipate and assert all kinds of causes of appeal.” In addition, C.H. Robinson complains that this prescient plea necessitated the cancellation of his own agreement – the real relief demanded by Lobrano. But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) explicitly considers this type of hypothetical alternative pleas.

When Lobrano, in the Louisiana action, “sought a judgment declaring the restrictive covenants null and void, void, and unenforceable,” C.H. Robinson had to recognize the very real possibility that the covenants would be declared unenforceable and plead accordingly, including Count VI`s assertion as a counterclaim. This is why we conclude that Count VI of C.H. Robinson`s amended appeal was brought at the time of Louisian.6 On the other hand, Louisiana courts have refused to allow non-competitive and restrictive restrictive agreements in the following areas: (1) if the treaty does not provide for a geographic area; (2) where the contract provides for restrictions “in the field in which the employer operates”; (3) where the Treaty provides for an area defined by radialm cables; and (4) finally, as in the Treaty before the Court of Justice, where the Treaty provides for a defined geographical area at a much wider level than the municipal or regional level. . . .